# Managing the Development Process and Aid

East Asian experiences in building central economic agencies (interim findings)


GRIPS Development Forum June 13, 2006 (@VDF)

### **Outline of Presentation**

- 1. About the GRIPS study
  - -- Focus of the analysis, basic premise
- 2. Country and historical context
- 3. Overview of central economic agencies in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines
  - -- Coordination mechanisms, factors affecting CEA effectiveness, drivers of CEA building, etc.
- 4. Synthesis

### GRIPS Study: Focus of the Analysis

- □ Coordination mechanisms of central economic agencies (CEA): Development Plans (DPs) and policy & resource alignment
- □ Key factors affecting CEA functions: leadership, technocrats, & donors, etc.
- □ Drivers of building effective CEA
- Countries:
  - Thailand & Malaysia (esp. 1970s-80s): now emerging donors
  - The Philippines (late 80s-): effort for CEA building



### **GRIPS Study: Basic Premise**

- □ Critical role of CEA in managing the development process
- ☐ Strategic coordination functions, core center of policy planning & resource alignment (incl. aid)
- □ Emphasis on country perspectives
  - Strategic use of aid -- for "graduation"
  - Selective adoption of foreign knowledge, tailored to the local context

(X donor-driven approach to institution building)

## **Country and Historical Context** of Three Countries

- □ Socio-economic indicators
- ☐ Stages of development
  - Structural transformation
  - Expansion of development expenditures
  - Mobilization of aid
- Crises and changes (both domestic and external environment)


[see handouts 1-3]


# Overview of CEA: Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines

#### <Points>

- ☐ How have coordination mechanisms worked? What are design features? [see next table]
- What is the role of DPs in policy and resource alignment?
- ☐ What is the role of aid in the development process?
- What are key factors for making CEA effective?
- What are drivers of building effective CEA?

CEA	Role of DPs and coordination mechanisms	Investment planning and monitoring
Thailand •NESDB, BOB, FPO, BOT	<ul> <li>Indicative DP; no budget implications</li> <li>Flexibility in MT planning + scrutiny via annual budget process</li> </ul>	·Use of same criteria & procedures for ODA & domestic projects
Malaysia ·EPU, ICU, MOF, CB	<ul> <li>Directive DP (incl. PIP);</li> <li>budget implications</li> <li>Enforcement of budget/sector</li> <li>ceiling for the plan period +</li> <li>adjustment at mid-term</li> <li>review</li> </ul>	·Use of same criteria & procedures for ODA & domestic projects ·Systemic impl. & monitoring
Philippines •NEDA, DBM, DOF, CB	·Weak synchronization among DP, PIP, budget ·"Dual track" policymaking process – Executive channel vs. Congressional interventions	·Use of appraisal & monitoring procedures limited to ODA & BOT projects





## **Coordination Mechanisms: Thailand and Malaysia**

#### ■ Differences:

- Degree of DPs binding medium-term resource allocation and project selection
- Indigenous institutions (Thailand), British tradition (Malaysia)

#### ■ Similarities:

- DPs serving as core documents for policy alignment (incl. PIP & aid)
- The Executive-led policymaking process; relatively good coordination among CEA
- Application of same criteria for both domestic & ODA projects

## Factors Affecting CEA Effectiveness: Thailand & Malaysia


- Alliance btw. leadership & elite technocrats, around shared visions
- Centralized authority of CEA in economic policymaking

	Thailand	Malaysia
Leadership	-Delegation to technocrats	-Top-down policymaking -Monitoring
Technocrats in CEA	-Empowered to plan & administer	-Technical support arm to realize PM's vision
	-Shared responsibility among the four agencies	-Centralized authority in PM's dept (esp. EPU)
Operating principles	-Subtle check & control, built-in flexibility	-Rule-based operations (inflexibility?)
	-Sector-level coordination not necessarily strong?	-Macro-sector coordination via "planning cells"

### **Drivers of Building Effective CEA: Thailand & Malaysia**

- Leadership: guiding CEA design (at turning points)
- Elite technocrats: absorbing & institutionalizing foreign knowledge, tailored to the local context

	Thailand	Malaysia
Original design	-Late 50s-60s under PM Sarit, with donor advice (WB, US, etc.) -Role of 1st generation of	-Late 50s-60s under PM Rahman & DPM Razak, with donor advice (WB, US, UK etc.)
	technocrats (e.g. Dr. Puey Ungphakorn)	-Role of 1 <sup>st</sup> generation of EPU technocrats
Enhancement	-80s under PM Prem: (the era of structural transformation) PM-led national committees for priority agenda	-70s under PM Razak: administrative machinery to implement New Economic Policy (71) -80s under PM Mahathir: public sector efficiency



## Coordination Mechanisms: The Philippines

- □ Limited role of DPs in policy & resource alignment
- ☐ PIP: weak scrutiny, "wish list" of projects
- □ Different treatment btw. ODA & domestic projects
- □ Divergence btw. expected and actual functions of CEA (within the Executive)
- Congressional interventions undermining the Executive efforts of DPs-PIP-budget synchronization and MTEF

### **Synthesis**

- ☐ Critical role of CEA in policy & resource alignment to DPs
- ☐ Diversity in institutional design of CEA
- □ Leadership matters, esp. at turning points (formation, design & effective functions of CEA)
- ☐ Importance of alliance btw. leadership and elite technocrats

### **Synthesis**

- □ Strategic use of aid by recipients, as an integral element of development (Thailand, Malaysia)
- □ Importance of political aspects (the case of the Philippines)
- Implications for Vietnam?

The END